AZ League Connection

The League's Monthly Online Newsletter

Issue 195: July 2019

Legal Corner: U.S. Supreme Court Update

The U.S. Supreme Court concluded its term in June and issued several decisions that are of interest to cities and towns. Thank you to Brandon Cartwright, League Summer Extern from Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at ASU, who contributed to the summaries of these six cases and provided excellent legal assistance this past summer.

Gamble v. United States

Petitioner Gamble pleaded guilty to Alabama’s felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute and was subsequently indicted for the same act by federal prosecutors. Gamble filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and argued that the dual sovereignty doctrine’s allowance of charging for both a federal and state crime violated his right to avoid being “twice put in jeopardy” under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court denied his motion and he pleaded guilty but preserved the right to challenge the ruling. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and Gamble appealed to the Supreme Court.

On June 17, 2019, writing for the majority in a 7-2 opinion, Justice Alito explained that the same offense occurs when a person is tried twice for a violation of the same law. However, because there are two sovereigns there are two separate sets of laws, and in turn, two separate offenses. Additionally, the existence of two separate sovereigns creates two separate harms to be vindicated in case of a violation of their laws. He illustrates this point by hypothesizing a situation where an American is killed abroad. Without the dual sovereignty doctrine, the United States would be unable to charge the defendant if the country where the crime occurred had already initiated proceedings. Granting Gamble’s motion means both the foreign country’s interest in protecting their peace within the territory and the United States’ desire to punish the perpetrator of one of its nationals could exist, but only one could be served. The Court was not persuaded by Gamble’s arguments and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. Although this case does not change normal practices of cities and towns, it is worthwhile to note that the Court emphasized the importance of this 170-year legal doctrine that allows for federal and state claims to be tried separately.

Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, et. al.

The Township of Scott, Pennsylvania enacted an ordinance requiring all cemeteries to be open to the public during daylight hours. Petitioner Knick was notified that she was in violation of the ordinance because the small family cemetery on her property was not accessible during the day. Knick sought declaratory and injunctive relief but did not seek compensation for the taking by bringing an inverse condemnation action under state law.

Her action was dismissed for lack of standing when the Township ceased enforcement of the ordinance during the proceedings. Knick then filed a Fifth Amendment taking claim in federal court where her case was dismissed because she did not exhaust the required state remedies before filing her federal claim pursuant to a previous decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

On June 21, 2019, in a 5-4 majority opinion, the Court recognized an unintended “preclusion trap” had been created for a plaintiff attempting to bring a Fifth Amendment taking claims in federal court. In 2005, twenty years after setting forth the requirements of exhausting state court claims in Williamson County, the Supreme Court decided in San Remo v. Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) that a federal court could no longer hear a claim after it had been decided by the state courts. This meant plaintiffs seeking compensation for a taking could not go to federal court without going to state court first; but going to state court and losing also meant they could no longer pursue a claim in federal court. The Court was not persuaded by the Township’s argument that state courts are best suited to adjudicate land use claims or that the plaintiff had other state remedies to pursue, and overturned Williamson. The Court held that a plaintiff must be able to exercise the right to just compensation for a taking under the Fifth Amendment by allowing them to immediately bring a claim in federal court “as soon as a government takes his property for public use without paying for it.” Therefore, when a city or town exercises their eminent domain power, it is possible that a federal claim may be filed immediately without first engaging in state court proceedings.

American Legion et. al. v. American Humanist Assn. et. al.

As first discussed in the March Legal Corner, in the 1920’s, Prince George County, Maryland erected a 32-foot tall Bladensburg Peace Cross in a public area to commemorate 49 local soldiers who were killed in action during World War I. The American Humanist Association filed a lawsuit claiming the cross violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the respondents but on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the cross was unconstitutional.

On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s decision and held the use of the cross is consistent as a contemporary secular symbol and lacks any religiously discriminatory intent. In a 7-2 (plurality) decision, Justice Alito explained that Court’s jurisprudence has adopted a less rigid approach to these types of First Amendment cases by examining factors such as the historical connotation of the display, any religiously exclusive uses, and differing interpretations of the symbol. Explaining that while the shape of the memorial may represent a religious symbol to some, a cross has been incorporated into everyday life as a secular symbol such as in corporate logos and war monuments. Here, the memorial is a tribute to the young men from the community who perished, and it has historical significance for the residents. Additionally, the Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the cross represented discriminatory intent because the petitioners were unable to provide any evidence that the cross was connected with anti-Semitism and the Ku Klux Klan and the memorial includes the names of Jewish and African American soldiers.

Municipalities across the country have memorials and statues with religious messages that were established decades ago. While this decision doesn’t authorize or encourage the establishment of religious symbolism, it continues the Court’s jurisprudence that in future challenges existing displays and practices will be analyzed for their contemporary use and intent in addition to historical underpinnings.

City of Escondido, California, et. al. v. Marty Emmons

After responding to a domestic violence call, Escondido police Officer Craig subdued and arrested Marty Emmons for failing to comply with a police order. Emmons brought a claim for excessive force. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Craig based on qualified immunity because the officer’s actions did not clearly violate any law under the circumstances. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing a previous case where qualified immunity did not apply to an officer who applied force against a person in passive resistance solely because “the right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at the time in question.”

On January 7, 2019, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court explained that when analyzing qualified immunity, a violation of a standard must be defined clearly and with specificity. This is especially important in fact-dependent excessive force cases, where it is difficult for officers to apply legal doctrine. The Court held that police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless there is precedent squarely governing the facts at issue. Any right must be sufficiently definite that the officer understands when he is violating a clearly established right. The Court found that the Ninth Circuit contravened settled principles and should have asked “whether clearly established law barred Officer Craig from stopping and taking down Emmons in this manner as Emmons exited the apartment” rather than utilizing a more abstract standard, such as general violation of a right to be free from excessive force. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit judgment and remanded for further review. When examining an excessive force claim, the Court requires review of established fact-similar precedent when making qualified immunity determinations unless no precedent exists and a right was clearly violated.

Department of Commerce et. al. v. New York et. al.

In March 2018, Department of Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced his decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census (see March Legal Corner for more background information). Multiple claims were filed by states and non-governmental organizations challenging the decision on various grounds, including failure to abide by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA allows courts to review acts by administrative agency and set aside actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” The District Court held, and the 5-4 Supreme Court affirmed, that Secretary Ross’ initial DOJ explanation was inadequate to show that his basis for the decision and proceedings must be remanded back to the Department of Commerce for an alternative explanation. While the Court found the Enumerations Clause allows for a citizenship question and its addition was supported by evidence, the Court rejected the argument that the Census Act allows Secretary Ross with unreviewable discretion about the type of questions to add to the decennial census questionnaire and held his actions are subject to judicial review. Ultimately, the Court stated that “the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his decision” to add the citizenship question and “if judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case.”

While the Court ruled that Secretary Ross had not abused his discretion because he had assessed multiple information streams in making a balanced decision, they reiterated that “agencies must pursue their goals reasonably” as required under the APA.

Although there have been multiple reports about next steps for the census process, at this time the questionnaires have been sent to the printer without the citizenship question and it is unlikely that the 2020 Census will include a citizenship question on the decennial questionnaire.

Rucho v. Common Cause et. al.

This case was a consolidation of two partisan gerrymandering cases from North Carolina (Rucho) and Maryland (Lamone v. Benisek), with claims brought by Democrats and Republicans, respectively. The plaintiffs alleged that the gerrymandering violated the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2, of the Constitution. It was clear by the record that both political parties openly admitted to partisan gerrymandering in these states and an intent to exclude the other parties in their respective cases. The District Courts in both cases found violations of the Constitution and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

On June 27, 2019, in a 5-4 decision, the Court held “that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts” and federal courts cannot redistribute political power without constitutional authority. Justice Roberts distinguished between cases of partisan gerrymandering and previously decided cases of racial gerrymandering, stating that the Court was well within its authority to hear racial gerrymandering cases because diluting a person’s vote based on racial classification is a justiciable question under the Equal Protection Clause. However, this reasoning and protection does not translate into the current case of gerrymandering by political party. There are no Constitutional protections granted to persons based on political affiliation and “the Constitution supplies no objective measure for assessing whether a districting map treats a political party fairly.”

Justice Roberts emphasized that the Court does not condone partisan gerrymandering but there are more effective ways to address the issue such as Congress’ Constitutional authority to regulate elections, amendments to state constitutions, and the creation of independent redistricting commissions. Because Arizona uses an independent redistricting commission that must adhere to specific criteria, it is unlikely that this case substantially affects Arizona cities and towns. However, especially in States where political districts are still drawn by legislative committees, this decision demonstrates that federal courts are limited in making decisions on this increasingly prevalent issue.

Conclusion

Two additional cases were reviewed in earlier articles: Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido, et al. (application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to local governments) was highlighted in the November Legal Corner and Timbs v. Indiana (involving excessive fines) was discussed in the March Legal Corner.

These cases show the wide range of decision faced by the U.S. Supreme Court this past year and the impact of those decisions on cities and towns. For more information, please view the following resources for more case information and analysis.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/
http://www.scotusblog.com/
http://statelocallc.squarespace.com/

 

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